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Ireland's economy has made an outstanding progress in the last 40 years goingfrom a
relatively poor country to the present EU average per capita income. The Irish economy was
deliberately opened around 1960, after decades of following an import-substitution industrialisation
policy. The Irish government established an agency for attracting FDI and decided to apply for
membership in the EEe. Before joining EEC Ireland signed the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement
(AIFTA) with the UK in 1965. Eight years later Ireland finally joined EEC together with UK and
Denmark. Today, the main risk facing the Irish economy in the medium term is a global recession,
especially one originating in the US which is the source of most of Ireland's FDI.
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1. Introduction
Forty years ago, the Irish economy could be
described as relatively poor, agricultural, protection-
ist, with declining population and high out-migra-
tion and an excessive dependence on the neighbour-
ing British economy in terms of both exports and
imports. Today, income per head is around the ED
average, the contribution of agriculture to GDP has
fallen to 5 percent, population is growing (fuelled
by in-migration), the economy is one of the most open
in the world - and it is growing at the fastest rate in
Europe. But, if Tables 1 and 2 describe an economy
that has experienced a remarkable transition since
1961, one should not look for miracles in seeking to
explain it. Apart from the first six years of the 1980s
when growth was stagnant, and the last six years of
the 1990s when growth was spectacularly high, the
experience over the forty-year period has been one
of steady, long-term economic and social develop-
ment.
What explains the Irish transition? What ma-
jor events and policy initiatives have influenced it
* Professor; Centre for Development Studies, University Col-
lege Dublin
since 1960? What role has been played by ED policy
and structural funds? And, in what ways have other
- specifically Irish - factors interfaced with EU fac-
tors in explaining the remarkable transition especially
during the last decade?
Having followed - and finally acknowledged
the limits of - an import-substitution industrialisa-
tion (ISI) policy from the 1920s to the end of the
1950s, the Irish government deliberately set about
opening up the economy around 1960. The Control
of Manufacturers Act - which had limited foreign
ownership of Irish industry to minority holdings -
was repealed and a government agency (later to be
called the Industrial Development Authority, or IDA)
was established to attract in foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) with the help of grants and tax holidays.
(The IDA's strategy has been refined over the years
from an early shotgun approach (all investors wel-
come irrespective of product or technology) to a fo-
cus on specific branches and, more recently, to a sys-
tematic pursuit of individual corporations in knowl-
edge-based industries and financial services with a
view to promoting production synergies and agglom-
eration economies). The second major step taken by
the Irish government designed to open up the
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Table 1. Structure of Irish Economy 1961 and 1998
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1961 (%) 1998 (%)
SHARE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 36.0 9.0
Industry 24.6 29.8
Services 39.4 61.2
SHARE OF GDP AT FACTOR COST
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 24.4 5.3
Industry 30.7 39.1
Services 44.9 55.6
SHARE OF GOODS EXPORTS
Live Animals 22.3 0.2
Other Agricultural 34.6 6.4
Industrial 41.0 91.2
Miscellaneous 2.1 2.2
DESTINATION OF GOODS EXPORTS
UK 71.5 22.2
Other EU and EFTA 12.8 48.5
Other 15.7 29.3
EXPORTS AS SHARE OF GNP 31.6 96.4
Source: Baker (1999), p36
economy was applying to join the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC). However, given the econo-
my's enormous trade dependence on that of the UK,
accession had necessarily to await that of the latter.
In the meantime, and in preparation for the shock of
free trade within Europe, Ireland began unilaterally
to dismantle its protectionist barriers and, crucially,
in 1965, signed the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agree-
ment (AIFTA) with the UK. In 1973, in the first en-
largement, Ireland (together with the UK and Den-
mark) joined the EEC (now EU, and hereafter gen-
erally so described),
In 1973, Ireland's GDP per head was 60% of
the EU average. There were no motorways in the
country. Moreover, investment in human capital
(health and education) had not expanded at the same
rate as in other northern European countries after
the second world war. It was' not until 1967 that free
secondary education was introduced (Fitz Gerald,
Kearney, Morgenroth and Smyth 1999,37). Conse-
quently, in 1973, human infrastructure was at the low
end of the northern European standard,
2. The role of EU regional
policy and structural funds
in Ireland's transition
2.1. Evolution of EU
regional policy 1975-93
After the first enlargement, the European Com-
mission (EC) became concerned about interregional
differences in levels of living. In 1975, its regional
policy was launched and a Euro-
pean Regional Development Fund
(ERDF) was established and di-
vided into quotas among the mem-
ber states as follows: Italy 40%,
UK 28%, France 15%, Germany
(West) 6.4%, Ireland 6% with the
remaining 4.6% divided among
Belgium, Netherlands and Luxem-
bourg. The grants were spent
mainly on (physical infrastructure)
projects and the additionality prin-
ciple applied. Member states were
in the driving seat: they also as-
sisted their poorer regions to im-
prove training andjob creation, and
promote rural restructuring with
the other two 'structural funds', the
Social Fund which had been estab-
lished under the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and the
Guidance section (Gu) of the European Agricultural
Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF), which had
been set up in 1962 as part of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP). The ERDF was reformed in 1979
and in 1984. The effects were, first, to introduce and
gradually increase, a non-quota section that was to
be spent on coherent aid packages or programmes
and, second, for the Commission to gradually assume
more control over regional policy and spending
The 1989 reform was more fundamental. It
followed in the wake of the 1986 Single European
Act that was designed to complete the single Euro-
pean market (SEM) through the 'four freedoms'. It
was assumed that this would impact negatively on
the poorer regions. The new approach to regional
policy affected all three existing structural funds: they
were increased very significantly in size and set
within a common set of objectives and a common
framework. Objective 1, under which 65% of the
structural funds were spent in the 1989-93 program-
ming period, and 69% in the 1994-99 period, was
aimed at developing the poorer or 'structurally-back-
ward' regions (those with GDP per head less than
75% of the Community average) and in promoting
interregional convergence. Member states produced
regional plans and, following negotiations between
them and the Commission, a community support
package was agreed for the programming period. The
entire national territories of Greece, Ireland and Por-
tugal- and most of Spain - were classified as Objec-
tive 1 regions and, following negotiations with the
Commission on their plans (national! from their
points of view, regional from the point of view of
the Commission), the Commission produced Com-
munity Support Frameworks (CSFs) for them. The
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Maastricht Treaty in 1993 led to the creation of the
Cohesion Fund to strengthen economic and social
cohesion throughout the Union and help the poorer
member states (those with incomes per head less than
90% of the Union average) to prepare for economic
and monetary union (EMU) and the introduction of
the single currency. The 'Cohesion Four' (C4) were
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
2.2. Receipts, expenditures,
and impacts of Structural
and Cohesion Funds in Ireland
2.2.1. Receipts
Prior to 1989 reforms, inflows into Ireland
from the structural funds were relatively small. In
1975, it received IL3.6 million': in 1980, IL125 mil-
lion. After 1989, inflows increased very significantly.
During the programming period 1989-93, it received
a total of IL3.5 billion. In the 1994-99 period, re-
ceipts totalled IL5.4 billion (lL4.4 billion under struc-
tural funds and around IL 1 billion under the Cohe-
sion Fund). Of course, structural fund grants can meet
only part of the cost of operational programmes un-
der the CSFs because of the additionality principle.
The limit was 80% in the Objective 1 regions of the
'Cohesion 4'. The actual level of EU co-financing
of investment in Ireland has been between 40-48%.
Thus, during the 1994-99 period, complementary
public and private sector funding brought total ex-
penditure to over IL8 billion. Although Ireland re-
ceived the highest inflows per head of population,
total inflows amounted to only 3.4% of total EU
spending on structural funds and the Cohesion Fund
during 1994-99.
In common with other EU member states, Ire-
land's agricultural sector also benefits from the rela-
tively high output prices and the various subsidies
paid to member states under the common agricul-
tural policy (CAP). These benefits eased the burden
of structural adjustment in the shrinking agricultural
sector. Combined inflows into Ireland from CAP,
structural funds, and Cohesion Fund over the period
1973-98 totalled IL23 billion. On average, receipts
from the structural funds and Cohesion Fund
amounted to around 2.5% ofGDP per annum during
the decade 1989-99. Estimates suggest that they
boosted growth by around 1% per annum on aver-
age.
During the 2000-06 programming period, Ire-
land's receipts from structural funds and the Cohe-
sion Fund will fall to around IL3 billion. Because of
its progress to date in converging toward average EU
incomes measured in terms of GDP per head', Ire-
land's structural funds receipts are being substan-
tially reduced during the current period. By 2006, it
will receive around 20% of what it received a dec-
ade earlier. The country has been divided into two
regions: the Border/Midlands/West region retains
Objective 1 status while the East/South region is an
Objective 1 region in transition. After 2006, it is
likely that the whole territory will be classified as an
Objective 2 region (an area undergoing change in its
Table 2. Some Indicators of Irish Economic Performance 1961-97
Annual Average Percentage 1961-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-97
Growth
GNP 3.7 4.1 3.8 4.1 0.4 3.6 4.7 6.9
Investment 12.4 6.1 3.2 8.2 -3.2 3.9 1.9 12.2
Employment 0.4 -0.2 0.6 1.5 -1.4 1.0 1.9 3.5
Average Industrial Earnings 7.1 10.8 18.1 18.8 13.5 4.8 3.9 6.1
Consumption Deflator 4.5 5.5 13.7 14.6 11.2 3.3 2.5 1.1
Five Year Averages 61-65 66-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-97
EBR as percent of GNP' 6.0 5.7 8.9 11.5 13.3 5.7 2.2 0.9
Current AlC as % of GNP -4.0 -3.1 -5.0 -9.7 -9.4 -1.7 2.5 3.2
Balance of Trade as % of GNP -8.0 -7.0 -8.6 -12.6 -5.9 5.0 9.9 14.2
Unemployment Rate" 4.8 5.1 6.0 8.1 13.6 16.1 15.4 12.3
Net Emigration (0005) 14.8 14.2 -11.5 -8.5 8.4 32.0 0.3 -11.5
• Prior to 1975, Exchequer Borrowing Requirement data refer to Public Authorities Borrowing Requirement.
•• Measured on Labour force PES basis, not on ILO basis.
Source: Fitz Gerald, Kearney, Morgenroth, and Smyth (1999), p31
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industrial and services sectors, in declining rural and
urban areas, and in areas of high unemployment).
Ireland's net beneficiary position has already de-
clined from 6.3% ofGDP in 1991 to 3.9% ofGDP
in 1998. By 2007, Ireland will be a net contributor to
the EU budget.
2.2.2. Expenditures
Four main expenditure priorities were identi-
fied under Ireland's Community Support Framework
(CSF) for the 1994-99 programming period - as they
programme was to enhance the contribution of the
fisheries sector to growth and employment in coastal
communities. Under the fourth operational pro-
gramme of Priority 1, supports for investment in
construction and in training in the tourism sector were
designed to expand employment and extend the tour-
ist season.
Investment in physical infrastructure (Prior-
ity 2 in the CSF) performs a crucial role within the
CSF, given Ireland's peripheral location within the
EU. The operational programme included support
for investments in motorways and urban bypasses,
upgrading of the rail network, the three national air-
ports (Dublin, Cork, Shan-
non), and the ports of Dub-
lin and Cork. Within the en-
ergy and telecommunica-
tions sector, the focus was
on electricity (the main
source of energy in Ireland)
and on developing alterna-
tive and renewable energy
sources.
The single opera-
tional programme under Pri-
ority 3 (Human Resources)
was designed to enhance
human capital and promote
competitiveness and em-
ployment opportunities through investments in edu-
cation and training. It also included training schemes
for managers in SMEs and for the unemployed. Un-
der Priority 4 (Local urban and rural development),
support was provided, through one operational pro-
gramme, for a range of services at local level, based
on development plans prepared by Area-based Part-
nerships in designated disadvantaged areas and com-
munities in other areas, and area renewal plans pre-
pared by local authorities.
The Commission reserved 9 percent of the
structural funds for its Community Initiatives. A to-
tal of ten initiatives are financed in Ireland during
the 1994-99 period. They included support under
INTERREG 11 for cross-border cooperation and the
peace and reconciliation programme being imple-
mented in the border counties in both Ireland and
Northern Ireland.
In addition to receipts from the structural
funds, Ireland received over IL 1 billion (c 1.3 billion
Euros) from the Cohesion Fund during the period
1994-99. These funds were spent on investments in
physical infrastructure including roads (37%), rail-
ways (12.4%), ports (7.7%), water supply schemes
(16.3%), waste water schemes (24.8%), and techni-
cal assistance (1.8%).
Table 3. Total Financing of Ireland's 1994·99 CSF by Priority
(Euro billions and %)
Priority Total % EU Contri- % (1989·93)
Investment bution
36.9)
1. Productive Sector 3.41 23.2 2.18 38.9
22.4)
2. Economic Infrastructure 6.50 44.0 1.11 19.8
39.5)
3. Human Resources 4.52 30.6 2.11 37.6
0.2)
4. Local Urban and Rural
Development 0.31 2.2 0.2 3.7
Source: Irish Business Bureau (1995), Ireland and the Structural Funds, p23, Brussels.
had been during the 1989-93 period. These were: the
productive sector, economic infrastructure, enhance-
ment of human resources, and local urban and rural
development. Table 3 shows the amounts in Euros
and as percentages of total investment expenditures
and of EU receipts under the four priority headings.
Percentages for the 1989-93 period are shown for
comparative purposes,
Under Priority 1, four operational programmes
provided direct support for productive investment,
as well as accompanying measures to improve the
business environment in the industrial sector; agri-
culture, forestry, and rural development; fisheries;
and tourism, In the industrial sector, the structural
funds supported strategies to promote employment
and enhance the competitiveness within the SEM of
both domestic and foreign enterprises - as well as
linkages between them - by promoting marketing
and research and technological capabilities. There
was a somewhat greater focus on domestic firms es-
pecially in food processing) and SMEs than had been
the case with the 1989-93 CSF. Within agriculture,
forestry, and rural development, the focus was on
diversification into non-surplus products and non-
agricultural activities (including farm-based tourism)
in rural areas, The objective of the third operational
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A number of attempts have been made to
evaluate the impacts resulting from structural funds
spending throughout the ED. Results are to be found
in the Annual Reports and Mid-term Reviews pub-
lished by the Commission as well as in the academic
literature. In summary, they all suggest that the im-
pacts are positive. The 1993 Report (European Com-
mission 1995) provided an initial assessment - pro-
vided mainly in terms of expenditure 'outcomes' -
for the 1989-93 programming period. In terms of'im-
pacts', it concluded that Ireland's GDP would be
2.5% higher at the end of the period than it would
have been in the absence of CSF inflows and that
the negative effects of the country's peripherality was
being significantly reduced.
The most interesting attempts to measure im-
pacts use macroeconomic models. Four such mod-
els have been used to date: Beutel, Pereira, QUEST,
and HERMIN. However, detailed quantitative con-
clusions need to be treated with caution because the
assumptions upon which the models are based are
often very restrictive. The approaches used can also
be questioned. As the Sixth Periodic Report points
out (European Commission 1999, 155), the evalua-
tions use macroeconomic models that compare de-
velopments in the regions in the post-assistance pe-
riod with those before: they estimate what would
have happened had the trends observed in the pre-
assistance period continued and thus 'an impression
can be gained of the possible effect of the assist-
ance' (ibid). These estimates do not directly meas-
ure policy impacts. Instead, they imply that any di-
vergence from previously observed trends result from
the measures implemented: the main difficulty arises
from the assumption that there has been 'no change
in the behavioural relationships observed in the past
and that no new factors emerge during the post-as-
sistance period, other than the introduction of the
policy itself, to affect the outcome' (ibid). Certainly,
in the case of Ireland, such an assumption would be
unrealistic. Changes at the level of institutions, in
the macroeconomic environment, in the growth of
FDI, and in the demographic structure, to name but
four factors ( section 3 below) that could be classi-
fied as mainly domestic in origin, have played very
significant roles in Ireland's transition, in addition
to those played by structural funds.
Despite such reservations, it is useful to ex-
amine the results of these evaluations. Given data
constraints, they are most relevant to the study of
structural fund impacts in the Cohesion 4 member
states whose territories, during the 1989-93 and 1994-
99 programming periods were entirely (Greece, Ire-
land, Portugal) or almost entirely (Spain) classified
as Objective 1 regions. Apart from listings of 're-
sults' or 'outcomes' (for example, miles of road built
or training programmes conducted), they provide the
best available estimates of 'impacts' of structural
funds on levels of income, employment, and so on.
CSFs have both demand-side and supply-side
effects. Through the former, inflows offunding lead
to increases in public spending which, in turn, pro-
motes economic activity, incomes, jobs, and taxes.
Through the latter, the CSFs improve infrastructure,
raise skills, subsidise investment by the private sec-
tor, reduce costs, improve productivity, and promote
economic growth. However, supply-side effects are
more difficult to estimate since their impacts take
more time to mature. Structural funds are designed
to effect permanent impacts on poorer regions and
to make a permanent contribution to interregional
convergence. If the transfers are used to fund invest-
ment in activities that improve output per head, rather
than merely boost short-term income improvements,
then permanent improvements in income are more
likely even if structural transfers are subsequently
cut off.
The Beutel model used input-output analysis
and focused on the overall and sectoral effects aris-
ing from the stimulus to demand. According to its
results, CSF funds during the two programming pe-
riods 1989-93 and 1994-99 are estimated to have
increased GDP growth by an average of 0.9 percent-
age points in the first period and 1.0 percentage points
in the second period in Greece and Portugal, 0.8 and
0.6 points in Ireland, and 0.3 and 0.5 points in Spain.
This compares with annual transfers from the struc-
tural funds equivalent to 3.4% of GDP for Greece,
3.2% of GDP for Portugal, 2.1% for Ireland, and
1.1% for Spain. This implies that, compared with
transfers received, the additional growth achieved
was somewhat greater in Ireland and Spain than in
Greece and Portugal. According to the Beutel model,
CSF transfers, together with the associated national
contributions, were responsible for financing over
30% of total investment in Ireland and Portugal and
over 40% in Greece. Thus, around 2-3% of the capi-
tal stock in each of the four countries was attribut-
able to the EU transfers. Although impacts on em-
ployment were not as significant (because grants and
subsidies to the private sector led to more capital-
intensive production methods), Beutel estimated that,
by 1999, around 800,000jobs, or 3.5% of total jobs
in the four countries would depend upon CSF inter-
ventions.
The richer member states also benefit from EU
transfers to the poorer regions. Beutel estimated that
over 25% of such transfers to the Cohesion 4 have
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leaked back to other member states through increased
imports. (A Commission study (European Commis-
sion 1996) estimated that 40% of structural funds
provided to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal during the
1983-93 period flowed back to other member states
for imports of equipment and technology).
Results obtained from the Pereira model, al-
though focused exclusively on supply-side impacts
(increases in GDP arising from improvements in
physical and human capital), are fairly similar to
Beutel's. The CSFs for the period 1994-99 are esti-
mated to have increased GDP on average by 0.4 to
0.6 percentage points per annum in Ireland and
Greece and by 0.6 to 0.9 percentage points in Portu-
gal. The QUEST 11 model, comes up with lower
results than either Beutel or Pereira (mainly because
of the model's assumptions regarding monetary and
fiscal sector influences). GDP growth is estimated
to have increased by only 0.3 and 0.1 percentage
points respectively in the two programming periods
in Greece, by 0.3 and 0.2 percentage points respec-
tively in the two periods in Portugal, by 0.3 percent-
age points during both periods in Ireland, and by 0.1
percentage points during both periods in Spain.
HERMIN models, like QUEST 11, incorpo-
rate both demand-side and supply-side effects.
One of the most interesting uses ofHERMIN
models was that made by Bradley et al (1995) to
analyse, not only CSF impacts but also the effects of
the single European market (SEM impacts) on the
Cohesion 4 during the 1989-93 programming period.
The simulations were carried out with various as-
sumptions as to whether or not the CSFs would con-
tinue after 1999, whether or not there would be
spillover effects (externalities) for the private sector
and the wider economy as a result of improvements
in infrastructure and skills, and the size ofCSFs rela-
tive to the size ofGDP. Some of the conclusions were:
Assuming the CSFs continue indefinitely but there
are no beneficial spillover effects for the private sec-
tor, GDP would be 7% higher by 2010 (than it would
have been in the absence of the CSF) in Portugal,
6% higher in Greece, and 1% higher in Ireland and
Spain. If it were assumed that the CSFs would end
in 1999 and that there were relatively strong
spillovers for the private sector, then GDP would rise
by 2% in Greece and by less than 1% in each of the
other three countries. (The results of a more recent
evaluation (Honohan 1997) suggests that if structural
funds were to be cut off after 1999, Ireland's GNP
would remain at least two percentage points higher
than it would have been without the transfers).
The single European market (SEM) has three
kinds of impacts on the Cohesion 4 countries: Static
impacts (effects on the economy as some sectors
expand and others contract as a result of integration
into the SEM); Locational impacts (is increased FDl
due to the SEM or to original EU accession?); and
Growth impacts (due to increased openness and
growth in the larger EU economies and increased
FDI). The results of the simulations suggested that
the static effects were positive for Ireland, margin-
ally negative for Portugal, moderately negative for
Spain, and strongly negative for Greece. Why these
differences? Ireland and Portugal have the largest
shares of output and employment in expanding sec-
tors. Moreover, Ireland had already experienced its
most significant negative impacts from being inte-
grated into a free trade area after the AIFTA was
launched in 1965. As regards locational effects and
growth effects, if increased FDI inflows are assumed
to be due to the SEM, then GDP in Ireland and Spain
would grow by an extra 9% by 2010, by 11.5% in
Portugal, and only marginally in Greece. On the other
hand, if increased inflows ofFDI are assumed not to
be due to the SEM, then Ireland's GDP grow still
grow by an extra 9% by 2010, Portugal's by 7.5%,
and the SEM would have only an insignificant im-
pact on GDP growth in Spain and Greece.
As regards estimation of the combined effects
of the CSFs and the SEM on the Cohesion 4, Bradley
et al concluded that there were too many factors at
work and too many imponderables to come up with
definitive answers. Their 'worst case scenario' sug-
gested that GDP would grow in Ireland by an extra 9
%, by 7.5% in Portugal, and effectively by zero in
Spain and Greece by 2010. Its 'best case scenario'
suggested that GDP would grow by an extra 23% in
Portugal, an extra 12.6% in Spain, and extra 11% in
Ireland, and an extra 7.5% in Greece by 2010.4
Is convergence working across the Union -
and is it working for Ireland? According to the Com-
mission (European Commission 1996), regional
funds (including the Cohesion Fund) have reduced
income gaps between EU member states. Dispari-
ties between states have narrowed more than have
those between regions (mainly because of strong
growth in Ireland, Portugal and Spain). In terms of
narrowing the gap vis-r-vis EU average GDP per
head, Ireland made the biggest improvement between
1983 and 1995. The Commission reported that, for
all (NUTS level 2) regions, widening disparities oc-
curred during the first half of the 1980s, followed by
a gradual narrowing during the second half of that
JANUARY - JUNE 2000 49~~~~~~-=~~---------------------------------------------------------
decade, and a levelling off in the 1990s (ibid). For
Ireland, the experience has been one of progressive
convergence albeit one that took a long time to gather
momentum. When it joined the EEC in 1973, Ire-
land's GDP per head was 60% of the Community
average. It rose to 62% by the end of that decade and
convergence continued at a slow pace during the
1980s when GDP per head in Ireland reached 66%
of the Community average. Thereafter, convergence
was rapid. It was during the 1990s that the pace ac-
celerated, driving GDP per head to 79% of the EU
average by 1992, to 88% by 1994, to 103% by 1997,
and to around 107% by the end of the decade.' Of
course, given the 14% gap between GDP and GNP
in Ireland, there remains much 'catching up' to be
achieved. By the end of the 1990s, Ireland's GNP
per head was around 85% of the EU average. In terms
of wealth (the stock of physical and human capital),
the gap is even more pronounced.
3. The role of 'other factors'
in Ireland's transition
As already noted, the Commission, in its Sixth
Periodic Report, had cautioned against placing too
much importance on the precise magnitudes of the
estimates for GDP growth that arose from the four
sets of evaluations based on the Beutel, Pereira,
QUEST and HERMIN macroeconomic models. Nev-
ertheless, it argued, the results of the four models all
point in the same direction: ' ... structural funds have
had a significant effect in reducing disparities in eco-
nomic performance across the Union and narrowing
the gap in GDP per head between the four Cohesion
countries and the rest of the Union' (European Com-
mission 1999, 157). It also adds, however, that if the
estimates derived from the models are compared with
changes in GDP per head in the four it becomes clear
that other factors, apart from structural funds, have
had a significant influence on relative performance.
'This is most notably the case for Ireland and Greece
which represent the two extremes in terms of GDP
growth' (bid). The Commission lists these 'other
factors' as: macroeconomic and other government
policies, FDI inflows, initial structure of economic
activity, business enterprise, and institutional factors
including social capital. A brief examination of some
of these factors, as they operate in Ireland, helps to
fill out the picture of the country's transition.
3.1. Macroeconomic policy
and the public finances
As Table 2 shows, the late 1970s was a period
of high economic growth in Ireland. But, in contrast
to that of the 1990s, it was unsustainable, driven by
huge public sector borrowing, high balance of pay-
ments deficits, and high inflation. During the 1980-
85 period, the average annual growth in industrial
wages and the rate of unemployment were both in-
creasing by over 13%. The economy had virtually
stopped growing and emigration had picked up
strongly. Beginning with the budget of 1987, the
public finances were brought under control - and
have remained so. The general government balance
moved into surplus in 1993. It is expected to remain
in surplus in the medium-term, rising from 1.6% of
GNP in 1998 to 3.2% in 2006 before falling thereaf-
ter (Duffy, Fitz Gerald, Kearney, and Smyth 1999,
96). The ratio of public debt to GNP fell from 108.5%
in 1993 to 55.1% in 1999. Thus, apart from the rela-
tively short but wasted period in the 1980s, Ireland's
transition has been characterized by sound macroeco-
nomic management and 'a prolonged series of policy
choices which harnessed the favourable trends and
encouraged the responses which resulted in sustained
progress' (Baker, op.cit., 40).
3.2. FDI inflows
One of the most decisive policy choices was
to abandon autarchy and to open up the economy to
free trade and FDI from 1960 (cfsection 1 above).
From this emerged an industrial isat ion policy that
offered free remission of profits and dividends to
foreign firms, and included a variety of grants and
tax incentives for all enterprises, all underpinned by
an industrial development agency whose approach
grew more sophisticated and focused over time. As
already noted, it is estimated that the contribution of
FDI to the growth ofIreland's GDP exceeds that from
the structural funds, it is important to remember that
some of the operational programmes within the Ire-
land's CSF include funds 'for the attraction of FDI'
and funds 'for the creation of linkages between in-
digenous and foreign industry' (cf section 2.2.2
above).
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3.3. Current
demographic structure
The Irish demographic structure at the begin-
ning of the new century is very favourable. Very sig-
nificant changes have taken place since the early
1960s. The population fell steadily between the cen-
suses of 1841 and 1961 from around 6.5 millions to
2.8 millions. However, as a result of the baby booms
of the 1960s and 1970s, it increased by 32% over
the past 35 years. The labour force has risen over the
same period by 42.6%, not only because of popula-
tion growth but also because of a strong rise in fe-
male participation rates. While the birth rate was al-
most 22 per thousand in the 1960s, it has fallen to 14
per thousand today. The dependency rate has now
fallen to around the EO average. It will soon fall to
an unusually low level mainly because a large per-
centage of those who could be expected to be in the
over-65 age cohort today emigrated from Ireland in
the period 1930-60 and did not return (Duffy, Fitz
Gerald, Kearney, and Smyth 1999,52-60). The com-
bination of all these favourable demographic factors
has played a significant role in Ireland's economic
transition in recent years.
3.4. Investment in human capital
The Irish government was slower in making
the decision to invest massively in education than
were other governments in northern Europe in the
post-world war two years. Free secondary education
was introduced only in 1967. This delay means that
a large proportion of the labour force still has lim-
ited formal qualifications - although the situation is
changing in more recent years. Of the generation now
retiring, about 60% had no more than a primary edu-
cation; of the generation now entering the labour
force, almost half have third-level education. Given
that new entrants greatly outnumber retirees, the
average educational attainment of the labour force
is increasing steadily and substantially (Baker, op.cit.,
41). There has been a major increase in investment
in education at both secondary and tertiary levels
since 1980 and data on participation suggest that the
current high level of investment in Ireland is on a
par with the EU average (Fitz Gerald, Kearney,
Morgenroth, and Smyth 1999, 59-61).
3.5. Institutional factors
and social capital
What could be described as a process of do-
mestic cohesion and inclusion has been developing
within Ireland in recent years. Beginning in 1987, a
series of national wage pacts have been agreed be-
tween the 'social partners'. They have delivered a
large measure of industrial peace and have made a
significant contribution to Ireland's level of interna-
tional price competitiveness. They have also con-
tributed to the attractiveness of the country for FDl.
Initially, there were three 'pillars' (government, pri-
vate sector employers, and trade unions) in the part-
nership but, more recently, this has increased to four
as representatives of the unemployed and of com-
munity groups have joined the partnership. The con-
tent of the negotiations and bargains have also ex-
panded: they now include tax as well as wage agree-
ments and entitle all the negotiators to a place at the
policy discussion table. Reflecting this greater
inclusiveness, the fifth and most-recently agreed pro-
gramme, covering 33 months to end-2002, is called
the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness.
The Irish government set up a national anti-
poverty strategy (NAPS) in 1997 as a consequence
of its commitments made at the UN Social Summit.
It included a definition of poverty, its main causes,
and a series of objectives to be achieved by 2007.
Although the number of people with incomes less
than half the average is the same or higher than it
was in 1994 - and 20% of the population still fell
below half the national average in 1997 - signifi-
cant reductions have been reported in the numbers
experiencing 'basic deprivation' (defined as those
deprived of basic necessities in the present Irish con-
text) since 1994 (Callen et al 1999). As a result, the
government revised the target in 1999 to one of re-
ducing 'consistent poverty' (households with low
incomes and deprived of basic necessities) to less
than 5% by 2004.
4. Conclusion
Because growth is export-led, and because it
is extraordinarily dependent on FDI, the main risk
facing the Irish economy in the medium term is a
global recession, especially one originating in the
US which is the source of most of Ireland's FDI. If
we can assume that this will not happen, then the
issue is whether the spectacular growth of the see-
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ond half of the 1990s will end in a hard landing or a
soft one. International organisations such as the IMF,
the OECD, and even the European Commission have
been issuing warnings recently about rising prices -
especially in asset markets including housing - and
wage pressures. The first is certainly true (as it is in
most rapidly growing areas including the Nether-
lands, Finland, and cities such as London) but the
recently concluded Prosperity and Fairness agree-
ment will help to restrain wage increases over the
next few years even if it cannot control them in sec-
tors where there are very acute skill shortages.
The general consensus among Irish economists
is that the landing will be a soft one and that the rate
of growth will gradually revert to a more 'normal'
European growth rate after 2010. Most would agree
with the Economic and Social Research Institute
(ESRI) forecasts that growth of GNP over the next
five years will average 5% per annum with Irish in-
come per head (measured in terms of GNP, not GDP)
reaching EU average levels by 2005 (Duffy, Fitz
Gerald, Kearney, and Smyth 1999, 110).
Ten years ago, there were one million people
working in the Irish economy: today it is 1.6 mil-
lions. Just as remarkable is the fact that an unem-
ployment rate of 17% has been reduced to less than
5% today. Indeed, in a number of activities, there
1 In analyzing the Irish economy, it is always useful to consider
it as a region of some economy larger than itself: in the period
up to 1973, this was the UK economy; since accession, it is the
large EU economy.
2 I Euro = 0.787564 Irish pounds
3 The authorities in Ireland have always argued that the income
criterion for assistance from structural funds should be GNP per
head (as it is for the Cohesion Fund) rather than GDP per head.
In Ireland's case, because of very high repatriation of profits
and dividends by transnational corporations located in Ireland,
GDP is around 14% higher than GNP.
4 Apart from the assumptions already mentioned, among the
reasons suggested by Bradley et al for the results were the
following: Restructuring within the manufacturing sector in
are now severe labour shortages. If unemployment
falls below 3%, some of the more extraordinary wage
increases that are currently being demanded in the
non-traded sector (especially services) could become
more generalised. However, there have been signifi-
cant improvements in productivity and, to date at
least, no loss of international competitiveness. The
analysis of many outside commentators tends to be
misplaced. Ireland is a small, open economy. Infla-
tion is largely externally determined. As a member
of Euroland, domestically generated inflation will
not affect international competitiveness.
As part of the negotiating process between the
Irish government and the European Commission in
the period leading up to the launch of the 2000-06
CSFs, the country was divided into two regions and
the government prepared a National Plan for the pro-
gramming period. The huge investments in physical
and human capital will be continued and, given the
reduced importance of EU funding, there will be an
increased focus on public-private partnerships in
implementing some of the transport projects. The
total cost of the plan will be IL40 billion and contri-
butions from structural funds and the Cohesion Fund
will amount to IL3 billion. In other words, the greater
part of the new national plan will be financed out of
domestic resources. •
NOTES
Greece was having very negative effects during the period; on
the other hand, it was benefiting from greater openness. The
opposite effects were operating in Spain at the time: restructuring
of manufacturing was not so negative but the economy was
relatively less open. Ireland was benefiting from both effects
while Portugal was benefiting from increased openness and
suffering only marginally from restructuring with industry. Indeed,
it scored highest overall because its CSF was the largest as a
percent of GDP and its multiplier was also highest among those
of the Cohesion 4.
5 The GDP per head in Ireland compared with the EU average
for the period 1994-96 was 90%. This was the basis on which
the Commission calculated structural fund entitlements for the
2000-06 programming period.
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